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The notion that the First Amendment protects academic freedom has been de-
scribed as mere “conventional wisdom.”1 The Supreme Court has similarly stressed 
                                                          
 
 1. Matthew W. Finkin, Intramural Speech, Academic Freedom, and the First Amendment, 66 
TEX. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (1988). 
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that academic freedom presents a First Amendment right of “special concern”2 and 
that “[t]he essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is 
almost self-evident.”3 
Despite these pronouncements, the Supreme Court’s cases provide only vague 
protections, if any, to academic speech and expression in higher education. Like-
wise, many lower courts are “remarkably consistent in their unwillingness to give 
analytical shape to the rhetoric of academic freedom.”4 This uncertainty unravels a 
context in which “attempts to understand the scope and foundation of academic 
freedom . . . generally result in paradox or confusion.”5 For these reasons, academic 
freedom has been accurately described as a problem, of which the cases are a pa-
thology.6 
Academic freedom’s problematic nature arises from at least three sources of 
tension, all of which run prominently through case law. First are university profes-
sors’ and faculty members’ interests in a First Amendment right to free speech and 
expression when performing research, scholarship, and teaching. Second is the 
government’s interest in smoothly functioning higher education institutions.7 Third 
is the judiciary’s efforts to determine whose interests should prevail.8 
These three tensions collided in Demers v. Austin,9 where the Ninth Circuit 
recognized and applied an academic speech exception to the public employee 
speech doctrine as set forth in Garcetti v. Ceballos,10 which holds that speech made 
pursuant to an employee’s “official duties” is categorically unprotected under the 
First Amendment.11 Given that Garcetti’s official duties inquiry excludes a signifi-
cant amount of speech from First Amendment protection, it is no surprise that Gar-
cetti’s categorical rule has been criticized as excessively constraining public em-
ployees’ free speech rights.12 However, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Supreme 
Court in Garcetti, left open whether an exception to the official duties inquiry may 
exist for speech “related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction.”13 
The Ninth Circuit in Demers properly resolved that uncertainty, reasoning 
that Garcetti’s official duties inquiry presents a limitation on academic freedom in 
                                                          
 2. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
 3. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). 
 4. Stuart W. Stuller, High School Academic Freedom: The Evolution of a Fish Out of Water, 
77 NEB. L. REV. 301, 302 (1998) (emphasis added). 
 5. J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the First Amendment,” 99 YALE 
L.J. 251, 252 (1989) [hereinafter Special Concern] (“There has been no adequate analysis of what academic 
freedom the Constitution protects or of why it protects it . . . .”). 
 6. RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES, at x (1955). 
 7. See Special Concern, supra note 5, at 288 (“When the Supreme Court came to constitution-
alize academic freedom, it encountered a tradition of values and personnel procedures protecting the indi-
vidual scholar from non-academic judgments by college administrators.”). 
 8. See HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 6, at 413–67 (discussing the additional tension 
that exists between academic freedom and big business). 
 9. 746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 10. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 11. Id. at 417. 
 12. Lauren K. Ross, Pursuing Academic Freedom After Garcetti v. Ceballos, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
1253, 1278 n.202 (2013) (noting that Garcetti “itself shows the danger of strict rules. The Court imposed a 
threshold question, whether the speech is pursuant to official duties, and provided no leeway for courts to 
protect speech if the answer to that question is yes.”). 
 13. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. 
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higher education that runs contrary to the First Amendment’s core values.14 The 
Ninth Circuit’s holding serves as a welcome pronouncement for university profes-
sors and faculty members by providing First Amendment protection for the re-
search, scholarship, and teaching that they were hired to perform. 
In addition to the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit has also recognized the ex-
istence of an academic speech exception to Garcetti.15 But the Fourth Circuit did 
not, in fact, apply the exception as the Ninth Circuit did.16 And, though the Fourth 
and Ninth Circuits have aligned in recognizing the existence of an academic speech 
exception, the Ninth Circuit has gone further than the Fourth Circuit to protect aca-
demic speech by defining “academic speech” to encompass matters beyond tradi-
tional research, scholarship, and teaching.17 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Demers further distinguishes the Ninth Circuit 
from three other circuits—the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits.18 Because these 
circuits have declined to resolve whether an academic speech exception may exist, 
these circuits apply Garcetti’s official duties inquiry and have typically held that a 
university professor or faculty member who speaks pursuant to his official duties is 
not entitled to First Amendment protection on grounds that he is speaking pursuant 
to his official duties, not as a private citizen.19 
This Article suggests that the Ninth Circuit in Demers v. Austin20 properly 
recognized and applied an academic speech exception to Garcetti’s official duties 
inquiry, providing an analytical framework that safeguards a First Amendment 
right to academic freedom in public universities. As essential background, Part II 
sets forth the public employee speech doctrine with the Supreme Court’s key cases. 
Part III addresses the Supreme Court’s uncertainty as to whether Garcetti’s official 
duties inquiry was intended to apply to academic speech. Part IV considers how the 
Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have applied Garcetti to academic speech to 
hold that university professors and faculty are not entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection in their work. Part V discusses how the Fourth Circuit advocated for an aca-
demic speech exception but resolved the case with Garcetti’s official duties in-
quiry. Part VI analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s resolution of Garcetti’s uncertainty in 
Demers by recognizing and applying an academic speech exception to Garcetti that 
                                                          
 14. This Article addresses academic freedom in public universities. But it must be noted that 
Demers’s holding, although addressing a university professor’s speech, was not expressly limited to higher 
education. See Amanda Harmon Cooley, Controlling Students and Teachers: the Increasing Constriction of 
Constitutional Rights in Public Education, 66 BAYLOR L. REV. 235, 273 n.260 (2014) (acknowledging that 
because Demers stated that “teaching and academic writing are at the core of the official duties of teachers 
and professors,” the Ninth Circuit’s decision “did not appear to foreclose its application to K-12 school 
teachers.”). Nonetheless, most courts consider it resolved that K-12 teachers do not enjoy a First Amend-
ment right to academic freedom. See, e.g., Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368–71 
(4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (holding that a K-12 teacher’s academic speech was government speech and there-
fore not protected under the First Amendment).  
 15. Compare Demers, 746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014), with Adams v. Trustees of the Univ. of 
N.C. Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 16. See Adams, 640 F.3d at 564. 
 17. See Demers, 746 F.3d at 411–16. 
 18. Compare Demers, 746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014), with Savage v. Gee, 665 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 
2012), and Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2009, and Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 
2008). 
 19. See Savage, 665 F.3d at 739; Gorum, 561 F.3d at 186; Renken, 541 F.3d at 775. 
 20. 746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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protects academic freedom. Part VII seeks to define academic freedom, concluding 
that academic freedom should function to properly balance the autonomy of the 
individual professor and academic institution. Part VIII revisits the cases discussed 
in Parts IV and V and applies Demers’s framework to determine whether Demers 
would have led to a different result. Part IX explains why an academic speech ex-
ception is necessary to protect disinterested research, scholarship, and teaching. 
Lastly, Part X concludes, suggesting that Demers provides the proper analytical 
framework to protect academic freedom in universities. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH DOCTRINE 
The US Constitution’s First Amendment states, in its absolute terms, that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”21 Despite the 
First Amendment’s plain language, which appears to provide an absolute right to 
free speech, history and case law show otherwise. Public employees have long 
faced significant constraints on their freedom of speech. For most of the twentieth 
century, “the unchallenged dogma was that a public employee had no right to ob-
ject to conditions placed upon the terms of employment—including those which 
restricted the exercise of constitutional rights.” 22 But in the mid-1950s and the 
1960s, in response to efforts requiring public employees, especially teachers, to 
“swear oaths of loyalty to the state and reveal the groups with which they associat-
ed,” the Supreme Court adopted a new approach.23 An analysis of the three key 
Supreme Court cases that form the modern public employee speech doctrine is set 
forth below.24 
A. Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 
In 1968, in Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School Dis-
trict, 205,25 the Supreme Court established that public employees enjoy a First 
Amendment right to free speech.26 There, Plaintiff Marvin Pickering, a high school 
teacher, drafted a letter in which he criticized how the Illinois Board of Education 
handled proposals to raise funding.27 Pickering voiced his criticisms by submitting 
his letter to a local newspaper, after which he was fired.28 The Court described the 
letter as follows: 
The letter constituted, basically, an attack on the School Board's handling 
of the 1961 bond issue proposals and its subsequent allocation of financial 
                                                          
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 22. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (acknowledging Justice Holmes’s quote that 
“[a] policeman may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman.”); see also Carol N. Tran, Recognizing an Academic Freedom Exception to the Garcetti Limita-
tion on the First Amendment Right to Free Speech, 45 AKRON L. REV. 949, 953–55 (2012). 
 23. Connick, 461 U.S. at 144. 
 24. Though more Supreme Court cases are certainly relevant to the development of the public 
employee speech doctrine, this Article discusses only those cases that are most relevant to the academic 
speech exception.  
 25. 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. at 564. 
 28. Id. 
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resources between the schools' educational and athletic programs. It also 
charged the superintendent of schools with attempting to prevent teachers 
in the district from opposing or criticizing the proposed bond issue.29 
The Court then clarified that the misguided theory that public employees re-
linquish their First Amendment rights by nature of their employee status has been 
unequivocally rejected.30 However, the Court conceded that the “State has interests 
as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly 
from those it possesses . . . with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in gen-
eral.”31 
Thus, given that Pickering’s right to free speech was not absolute, despite the 
First Amendment’s plain terms, the Court fashioned what has come to be known as 
the “Pickering-balancing test.” This test requires a balancing of “the interests of the 
teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the inter-
ests of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services 
it performs through its employees.”32 The Court identified five factors for consider-
ation, asking whether: 
1. A close working relationship existed between the educator and the peo-
ple whom he criticized; 
2. The speech addressed a matter of public concern; 
3. The speech had a detrimental impact on the administration of the educa-
tional system; 
4. The educator’s performance of his daily duties was impeded; 
5. The educator spoke as a public employee or as a private citizen.33 
Applying those factors to Pickering, his letter, and his termination, the Court 
found that: (1) Pickering had no working relationship with the Board; (2) Picker-
ing’s letter dealt with a matter of public concern, e.g., school funding; (3) Picker-
ing’s letter had no detrimental effect on the school’s administration; (4) Pickering’s 
letter did not compromise the performance of his daily duties as educator; and (5) 
Pickering wrote his letter as a private citizen, not as a public employee.34 The Court 
further emphasized that Pickering’s letter was neither shown nor could be pre-
sumed to have impeded the proper performance of his daily duties or interfered 
with the District’s regular operations.35 Based on the weight of those factors, the 
Court held that the District’s interest in preventing Pickering from speaking on the 
school funding issue did not tip the balance in the District’s favor to deprive Pick-
                                                          
 29. Id. at 566. 
 30. Id. at 568.  
 31. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.  
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 568–75; see also 1 WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION 693 (5th ed. 2013). 
 34. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568–75. 
 35. Id. at 571–74. 
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ering of his First Amendment right to free speech so as to fire him for writing his 
letter.36 
The Court employed this flexible balancing test for approximately a decade 
after Pickering, having tremendous discretion to weigh the interests on a case-by-
case basis.37 
B. Connick v. Myers 
Because Pickering’s flexible balancing approach did not highlight the im-
portance that the employee’s speech be on a matter of public concern,38 the Su-
preme Court refined Pickering’s flexible balancing test into a structured, if not rig-
id, two-step inquiry in Connick v. Myers.39 There, plaintiff Sheila Myers, an assis-
tant district attorney in New Orleans, brought suit for First Amendment retaliation 
when she was fired after having protested about being transferred to prosecute 
criminal cases in a separate division of criminal court.40 Specifically, shortly after 
Ms. Myers was transferred, 
she prepared a questionnaire that she distributed to the other Assistant Dis-
trict Attorneys in the office concerning office transfer policy, office mo-
rale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in super-
visors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in political cam-
paigns. Petitioner then informed respondent that she was being terminated 
for refusal to accept the transfer, and also told her that her distribution of 
the questionnaire was considered an act of insubordination.41 
Faced with Myers’s First Amendment retaliation claim, the Court raised two 
pointed issues for analysis: first, whether Myers spoke on a matter of public con-
cern, and second, whether Myers’s speech interfered with the employer’s abilities 
to discharge its official duties and maintain proper discipline.42 
                                                          
 36. Id. It should be further emphasized that although the Court recognized that Pickering had a 
legitimate interest in a right to free speech, the Court did not hold that Pickering’s right was absolute and 
explained several ways in which the District’s interest in efficiency could have hypothetically prevailed. See 
id. at 571–72 (“We are thus not presented with a situation in which a teacher has carelessly made false 
statements about matters so closely related to the day-to-day operations of the schools that any harmful 
impact on the public would be difficult to counter because of the teacher’s presumed greater access to the 
real facts.”). 
 37. See generally Elizabeth Dale, Employee Speech & Management Rights: A Counterintuitive 
Reading of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 182–83 (2008) (explaining that Pick-
ering’s test “treated th[e] balancing of interests as something less than a formal test”). 
 38. See, e.g., Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979) (applying Pickering’s 
balancing test to a primary schoolteacher’s speech made in private and finding in the teacher’s favor); 
KAPLIN & LEE, supra note 33, at 695 (stating that Givhan emphasized “the need to distinguish between 
communications on matters of public concern and communications on matters of private or personal con-
cern”). 
 39. 461 U.S. 138 (1983); see also Matthew W. Finkin, Symposium on Academic Freedom: In-
tramural Speech, Academic Freedom, and the First Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1323, 1331 (1988) (“De-
spite its claim of faithfulness to precedent, Connick work[ed] a major change in Pickering.”).  
 40. Connick, 461 U.S. at 140. 
 41. Id. at 138. 
 42. Id. at 143–45, 150–51. 
2015] SPRING EDITION 519 
 
The Court clarified that the first inquiry, that of public concern, was now to 
be treated as a threshold legal question.43 The Court stressed that whether speech 
addresses a matter of public concern requires looking at the “content, form, and 
context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”44 The Court further 
noted that speech falling into this category includes informing the public that a 
governmental entity failed to discharge its responsibilities, or otherwise “bring[ing] 
to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part of [the 
governmental entity or its officials].”45 But if the content, form, and context of the 
speech cannot be “fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or 
other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in 
managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of 
the First Amendment.”46 As to Myers’s questionnaire, the Court reasoned that only 
one question—that which concerned pressure to work on political campaigns—
addressed a matter of public concern, reasoning that government service should 
depend on merit, not political service.47 
In addition to fashioning a threshold “public concern” step, the second step of 
Connick’s inquiry, whether the employee’s speech interfered with the employer, 
further refined the Court’s flexible approach taken in Pickering.48 The Court in 
Connick noted that essential to this step is “full consideration of the government’s 
interest in the effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities.”49 This “full 
consideration” shifted the balance in the employer’s favor by requiring that 
“[w]hen close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibili-
ties, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.”50 Un-
der this deferential inquiry, the Court found in favor of Myers’s employer, conclud-
ing that Myers’s employer was not required to tolerate conduct that he reasonably 
believed would disrupt the office, undermine authority, and impede working rela-
tionships.51 
As Professor Dale noted, “[i]n Pickering, the Court emphasized that public 
employee rights to speak trumped the interests of public employers.”52 But in Con-
nick, “the Court had reweighed that balance, deferring to the interests of public 
employers at the expense of protecting the rights of public employees.”53 The Court 
adhered to Pickering-Connick, i.e., Connick’s public concern requirement and 
Pickering’s refined balancing test, without significant development until 2006.54 
                                                          
 43. Id. at 148 n.7. 
 44. Id. at 147–48.  
 45. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148. 
 46. Id. at 146. 
 47. Id. at 148. 
 48. Id. at 151; see also Dale, supra note 37, at 182–83. 
 49. Connick, 461 U.S. at 151. 
 50. Id. at 151–52 (emphasis added). 
 51. Id. at 151. 
 52. Dale, supra note 37, at 184. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See, e.g., San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 
(1994) (“[T]he government as employer indeed has far broader powers than . . . as sovereign.”); Bd. of 
Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); 
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C. Garcetti v. Ceballos 
In 2006, in Garcetti v. Ceballos,55 the Supreme Court narrowed the public 
employee speech doctrine to categorically exclude speech made pursuant to an em-
ployee’s “official duties” from First Amendment protection.56 Before the Court in 
Garcetti was a First Amendment retaliation claim made by Richard Ceballos, a Los 
Angeles County deputy district attorney.57 Ceballos argued that his employer, the 
Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, had retaliated against him by reas-
signing him and denying him a promotion after Ceballos distributed an internal 
memorandum in which Ceballos criticized inaccuracies in his subordinates’ work.58 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Los Angeles County.59 
The district court found that Ceballos was not entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion because he had written the memo pursuant to his duties as a district attorney, 
not as a private citizen.60 
When Ceballos appealed, the Ninth Circuit reversed.61 The Ninth Circuit ap-
plied the Pickering-Connick test.62 The Ninth Circuit held that Ceballos was enti-
tled to First Amendment protection for writing and distributing his memo, thereby 
rejecting the district court’s notion that a public employee’s speech is not protected 
under the First Amendment merely because it has been made pursuant to an em-
ployment responsibility.63 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Ninth Circuit’s holding. The Court 
began its analysis by acknowledging that government employees, by necessity, 
must accept certain limitations on their freedom.64 The Court further expressed that 
“public employees do not surrender all their First Amendment rights by reason of 
their employment. Rather, the First Amendment protects a public employee’s right, 
in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public con-
cern.”65 However, the Court clarified that these “certain circumstances” do not in-
clude speech made pursuant to an employee’s official duties, holding that “when 
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees 
are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution 
does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”66 
Reasoning that Ceballos had written and distributed his memo pursuant to his 
official duties, the Court concluded that Ceballos was not entitled to First Amend-
                                                          
 55. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 56. Id. at 421; see also Paul M. Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment Speech 
Rights of Federal Employees, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 117, 123 (2008) (criticizing the “overly-
formalistic view of a public employee as either being a citizen or a worker, but never simultaneously both”). 
 57. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414. 
 58. Id. at 412–13. The inaccuracies related to information set forth in an affidavit that was used 
to obtain a “critical” search warrant. For example, “the affidavit called a ‘long driveway’ what Ceballos 
thought should have been referred to as a ‘separate roadway.’” Id. at 414 (internal single quotes added). 
 59. Id. at 415. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1173–78 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 415–16 (quoting Ceballos, 361 F.3d at 1175). 
 64. Id. at 418. 
 65. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417 (emphasis added). 
 66. Id. at 421. 
2015] SPRING EDITION 521 
 
ment protection.67 The Court explained that restricting speech “that owes its exist-
ence to a public employee’s professional responsibilities does not infringe any lib-
erties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen. It simply reflects the 
exercise of employer control over what the employer itself had commissioned or 
created.”68 Because Ceballos was found to have spoken pursuant to his official du-
ties, there was no need to consider whether Ceballos’s speech addressed a matter of 
public concern, nor whether Ceballos’s interest outweighed Los Angeles County’s 
interests. 
With the addition of Garcetti’s threshold official duties inquiry, a public em-
ployee is entitled to First Amendment protection only if three requirements are met. 
First, the public employee must speak as a private citizen, not pursuant to his offi-
cial duties.69 Second, the speech must address a matter of public concern.70 Third, 
the speech must not cause significant disruption to the employer so that the public 
employee’s interests outweigh the employer’s interests.71 
III. DID GARCETTI CARVE OUT A CAVEAT FOR ACADEMIC SPEECH? 
Garcetti’s threshold official duties inquiry has been criticized as excessively 
limiting public employees’ First Amendment right to free speech and expression.72 
Indeed, as discussed, Garcetti’s official duties inquiry categorically excludes 
speech made pursuant to public employees’ official duties from the First Amend-
ment. However, Garcetti left unanswered a significant question of major concern 
for public university professors and faculty members. Near the very end of the 
Court’s majority opinion, Justice Kennedy broached the issue of academic speech: 
There is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or 
classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests that are 
not fully accounted for by this Court's customary employee-speech juris-
prudence. We need not, and for that reason do not, decide whether the 
                                                          
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 421–22. 
 69. Id. at 421; see also KAPLIN & LEE, supra note 33, at 697 (stating that “[i]f the employee is 
speaking as an employee . . . one need never reach the question of whether the employee was speaking on a 
matter of public concern.”).  
 70. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415–17. 
 71. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568–69. However, even if the em-
ployee’s interests outweigh the university’s, the employee must also show that the employee’s protected 
conduct was a substantial or motivating factor in causing an adverse employment action. Mt. Healthy City 
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285–87 (1977). If the employee carries this burden, the 
burden then shifts to the university to show that the university would have taken the same action against the 
employee even absent any protected conduct. Id. 
 72. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 535, 539 (2007) (“[Garcetti] is 
not only a loss of free speech rights for millions of government employees, but it is really a loss for the 
general public, who are much less likely to learn of government misconduct.”); Martin Schwartz, Section 
1983 Civil Rights Litigation in the October 2005 Term, 22 TOURO L. REV. 1033, 1036 (2007). (“The Court 
could have held that this is potentially protected speech but has to be balanced against the government 
interest and weighed on a case-by-case basis. Instead, the Court said if the speech is pursuant to the em-
ployee’s official duties, it is categorically unprotected. I see that as being very significant. I think it is going 
to remove a fairly sizable chunk of public employee free speech retaliation claims.”). 
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analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case in-
volving speech related to scholarship or teaching.73 
Justice Kennedy’s hesitation was undoubtedly borne by the importance that 
the Court has traditionally placed on academic freedom. 74  Nonetheless, Justice 
Kennedy left the application of Garcetti’s official duties inquiry to academic 
speech uncertain. 
A. Justice Souter’s Concern 
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, dissented from the 
majority, expressing concern about Garcetti’s negative implications for academic 
freedom.75 On the one hand, Justice Souter conceded that “a government employer 
has substantial interests in effectuating its chosen policy and objectives, and in de-
manding competence, honesty, and judgment.” 76 But on the other hand, Justice 
Souter argued that Garcetti’s official duties inquiry was arbitrary, suggesting that 
the majority chose “an odd place to draw a distinction, and while necessary judicial 
line-drawing sometimes looks arbitrary, any distinction obliges a court to justify its 
choice. Here, there is no adequate justification . . . .”77 
Justice Souter expressed further caution about subjecting academic speech to 
the official duties inquiry, writing as follows: 
This ostensible domain beyond the pale of the First Amendment is spa-
cious enough to include even the teaching of a public university professor, 
and I have to hope that today's majority does not mean to imperil First 
Amendment protection of academic freedom in public colleges and uni-
versities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write “pursuant to . . . offi-
cial duties.”78 
Justice Souter’s concern was well-founded. Garcetti, read in its own, plain 
terms, necessarily excludes the research, scholarship, and teaching that university 
professors and faculty were hired to perform from First Amendment protection. 
This categorical exclusion would reduce academic speech to other classes of unpro-
tected speech, such as fighting words, obscenity, incitement of illegal activities, and 
child pornography, which, in contrast to academic speech, are categorically unpro-
tected due to their low value.79 
                                                          
 73. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
 74. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (“Academic freedom, 
though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the 
First Amendment.”); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) 
(“Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom . . . .”). 
 75. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 428–43 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 76. Id. at 428. 
 77. Id. at 430. 
 78. Id. at 438. 
 79. J. Peter Byrne, Book Review, 88 TEX. L. REV. 143, 163–65 (2009) (reviewing MATTHEW 
W. FINKIN & ROBERT C. POST, NEO-ORTHODOXY IN ACADEMIC FREEDOM FOR THE COMMON GOOD: 
PRINCIPLES OF AMERICAN ACADEMIC FREEDOM, and STANLEY FISH, SAVE THE WORLD ON YOUR OWN 
TIME) [hereinafter Book Review] (“The Garcetti formulation turns the principle of academic freedom on its 
head . . . [and] perversely eviscerates academic freedom by depriving it of any constitutional protection.”). 
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Understandably, educator litigants have asked courts to consider Justices 
Kennedy’s and Souter’s comments.80 But in Garcetti’s wake, with the Court’s min-
imal guidance, the weight that lower courts should give Justice Kennedy’s state-
ments is uncertain. And, if a court indeed chooses to recognize and apply an aca-
demic speech exception, the court then faces another challenge in determining 
when speech is sufficiently “related to scholarship or teaching” in the words of 
Garcetti.81 
IV. ONE SIDE OF THE DIVIDE: GARCETTI’S OFFICIAL DUTIES INQUIRY 
CONTROLS 
Despite Justice Kennedy’s uncertainty and Justice Souter’s express caution in 
Garcetti, the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have aligned in choosing either to 
decline resolving whether an academic speech exception may exist or to reject rec-
ognizing its existence altogether.82 
A. The Third Circuit 
In Gorum v. Sessoms,83 the Third Circuit declined to resolve whether an aca-
demic speech exception may exist and instead held that Garcetti’s official duties 
inquiry applied to professorial speech. In Gorum, Delaware State University (DSU) 
conducted a grade audit after learning of irregularities in a student athlete’s tran-
script.84 During the audit, DSU found that Plaintiff Wendell Gorum, a tenured pro-
fessor who served on several committees, had changed withdrawals, altered incom-
pletes, and forged grades for 48 students in DSU’s Mass Communications Depart-
ment.85 Gorum admitted his misconduct.86 When DSU suspended Gorum and be-
gan proceedings to dismiss him, Gorum requested a hearing before DSU’s discipli-
nary committee.87 
The disciplinary committee determined that Gorum’s actions undermined the 
tenets of DSU’s educational profession and thus deserved condemnation from 
DSU’s academic community. 88  The disciplinary committee recommended that 
Gorum be disciplined with a lengthy suspension and no pay, but not terminated.89 
Despite those recommendations, DSU President Allen Sessoms concluded that 
Gorum’s misconduct warranted termination.90 
                                                          
 80. KAPLIN & LEE, supra note 33, at 698 (“Since Garcetti was decided, faculty litigants in nu-
merous cases have asked lower courts to consider the comments of Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter.”). 
 81. Id. at 698 (acknowledging the need to consider when faculty speech is “sufficiently ‘related 
to scholarship or teaching’ . . . to receive the protection of the exception”). 
 82. These circuits “apply various combinations of Pickering, Connick, and Garcetti . . . [and] 
employ the incredibly restrictive general governmental employee speech analysis test onto teachers without 
acknowledging the unique nature of the educational profession.” Cooley, supra note 14, at 269–70.  
 83. Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 84. Id. at 182. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Gorum, 561 F.3d at 182. 
 90. Id. 
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Nearly two years after he was fired, Gorum brought suit for First Amendment 
retaliation.91 Gorum pointed to his speech and expression on three occasions: (1) 
objecting to the selection of Sessoms as DSU President; (2) advising a student ath-
lete who had violated DSU’s weapon policy; and (3) rescinding an invitation for 
Sessoms to speak at a Prayer Breakfast. 92  The district court granted summary 
judgment in DSU’s favor, finding first that Gorum had failed to raise a genuine 
issue of material fact as to whether Sessoms even knew that Gorum had objected to 
Sessoms’s status as DSU President.93 As to the remaining two occasions, each 
arose within Gorum’s official duties as professor.94 The district court further found 
that Sessoms would have terminated Gorum even if Gorum had not engaged in any 
protected activity under the First Amendment.95 
The Third Circuit affirmed when Gorum appealed.96 Gorum argued that as-
sisting and advising the student athlete who had violated DSU’s weapon policy was 
protected because that speech was not made pursuant to Gorum’s official duties.97 
However, reasoning that the proper inquiry into official duties is a “practical one,” 
the court found that assisting the student athlete fell within the scope of Gorum’s 
official duties.98 This was because Gorum had extensive knowledge and experience 
with DSU’s disciplinary code, making him the “de facto advisor to all [DSU] stu-
dents with disciplinary problems.”99 The court likewise held that rescinding Ses-
soms’s invitation fell squarely within Gorum’s official duties.100 
In holding that Gorum spoke as a public employee and not as a private citi-
zen, thus failing Garcetti’s threshold official duties inquiry, the court acknowl-
edged that Garcetti did not answer whether the “official duty” analysis would apply 
to speech related to scholarship or teaching.101 Nonetheless, the court did not re-
solve whether an academic speech exception may exist. But even assuming the 
existence of an academic speech exception, the Gorum court concluded that Gar-
cetti’s official duties inquiry was proper because Gorum’s speech at the discipli-
nary hearing and in rescinding Sessoms’s invitation was “so clearly not ‘speech 
related to scholarship or teaching,’ and because [the court] believe[d] that such a 
determination here [would] not ‘imperil First Amendment protection of academic 
freedom in public colleges and universities.’”102 Like Garcetti, the Gorum court did 
                                                          
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 183–84. 
 93. Id. at 184.  
 94. Id. 
 95. Gorum, 561 F.3d at 184. The University argued, and the court found, that this misconduct 
presented a sufficient alternative basis upon which the University could terminate Gorum, regardless of 
whether Gorum’s expression was protected under the First Amendment. Id. at 188; see also Mt. Healthy 
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285–87 (1977) (holding that adverse employment 
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 102. Gorum, 561 F.3d at 186. It should be noted that if Gorum had challenged his termination 
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not specify what sort of speech would be sufficiently “related to scholarship or 
teaching” to warrant possible application of an academic speech exception. 
B. The Sixth Circuit 
In Savage v. Gee,103 the Sixth Circuit declined to resolve whether an academic 
speech exception may exist to Garcetti. In Savage, Plaintiff Scott Savage brought 
suit against Ohio State University (OSU), asserting that he was constructively dis-
charged in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights.104 Savage worked 
as Head of Reference and Library Instruction at OSU’s library.105 In his position, 
Savage regularly assisted faculty members and students with library research and 
designing course bibliographies.106 In addition, in 2006, Savage served on a faculty 
committee that was deciding which book would be assigned to all incoming fresh-
man students.107 
In a series of email exchanges with the committee, Savage provided four book 
recommendations and a short description of each book.108 One of Savage’s recom-
mended books, The Marketing of Evil, by David Kupelian, features a chapter “de-
scribing homosexuality as aberrant human behavior.”109 Savage’s email containing 
his recommendations did not specify that The Marketing of Evil contained this 
chapter.110 
The following day, committee member Norman Jones, who was fully familiar 
with The Marketing of Evil, described Savage’s recommendation as “anti-gay” and 
questioned Savage’s competency as OSU’s Head of Reference and Library Instruc-
tion.111 Jones also sent an email to a fellow committee member, stating that Sav-
age’s recommendation had severely compromised Jones’s confidence in OSU’s 
library. 112  Word of Savage’s book recommendation quickly circulated around 
OSU’s campus and created chaos, which was further exacerbated when faculty 
members began filing claims of harassment based on sexual orientation against 
Savage.113 
After taking a leave of absence for extreme emotional distress due to the cha-
os that his book recommendation had caused, Savage resigned from OSU and filed 
constructive discharge and First Amendment retaliation claims shortly thereafter.114 
The district court granted OSU’s motion for summary judgment, expressly declin-
ing to recognize Savage’s book recommendation as academic speech and therefore 
finding that Savage’s speech was not protected because Savage spoke pursuant to 
                                                                                                                                       
research, scholarship, or teaching and should have qualified as academic speech. See infra Part VII.B. 
However, as discussed, DSU’s legitimate interest in ensuring honesty and integrity in grading would have 
likely outweighed Gorum’s interest in having a right to forge grades. See id. 
 103. 665 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 104. Id. at 734. 
 105. Id. at 735. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Savage, 665 F.3d at 735. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at. 736. 
 114. Id. 
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his official duties.115 The court further concluded that Savage had not been con-
structively discharged but had voluntarily resigned.116 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed.117 Savage argued that his book recom-
mendation should qualify as protected academic speech, invoking Justice Kenne-
dy’s statements from Garcetti.118 But the court rejected Savage’s argument and did 
not resolve whether an academic speech exception may exist.119 Instead, the court 
reasoned that Savage spoke as a committee member, and thus, Savage spoke pursu-
ant to his official duties.120 But even assuming that “Garcetti may apply differently, 
or not at all, in some academic settings,” the court concluded that Savage’s recom-
mendation was only “loosely, if at all, related to academic scholarship.”121 Like 
Garcetti, the Savage court did not indicate exactly what speech would suffice as 
“academic scholarship” to warrant further consideration of an academic speech 
exception, but the court found that Savage’s book recommendation was not suffi-
cient, despite that Savage recommended the book for assignment to all incoming 
freshman. 
C. The Seventh Circuit 
In Renken v. Gregory,122 the Seventh Circuit, without considering the exist-
ence of an academic speech exception to Garcetti, held that Garcetti’s official du-
ties inquiry applies to professors’ speech concerning teaching. In Renken, plaintiff 
Kevin Renken, a tenured professor at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee 
(UWM), protested funding conditions that UWM and Dean William Gregory had 
attached to Renken’s fund for a National Science Foundation (NSF) project.123 Be-
lieving that some of UWM’s conditions violated NSF regulations, Renken sought 
to negotiate the conditions.124 After Renken’s negotiation efforts failed, Renken 
emailed the Secretary of UWM’s Board of Regents, writing as follows: 
                                                          
 115. Savage, 665 F.3d at 736–37. 
 116. Id. at 737, 740. 
 117. Id. at 738–39.  
 118. Id. at 739. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Savage, 665 F.3d at 739. The court also concluded that “Savage [could not] prevail on his 
First Amendment retaliation claim because he has failed to present evidence of any adverse employment 
action.” Id. Despite the Savage court’s uncertainty as to whether an academic speech exception may exist, 
other courts in the Sixth Circuit suggest that it does. Compare Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City 
Exempted Village Sch. Dist, 624 F.3d 332, 343 (6th Cir. 2010) (reversing district court’s conclusion that a 
K-12 schoolteacher’s speech was exempt from Garcetti’s public employee speech doctrine. While the court 
recognized the possibility of an academic speech exception to Garcetti, the court did not resolve the matter 
and emphasized that even if the academic speech exception existed, a primary schoolteacher fell “outside 
the group the dissent wished to protect.”), with Kerr v. Hudd, 694 F. Supp. 2d 817, 843–844 (S.D. Ohio 
2010) (“Even without the binding precedent, this Court would find an academic exception to Garcetti. 
Recognizing an academic freedom exception to the Garcetti analysis is important to protecting First 
Amendment values. Universities should be the active trading floors in the marketplace of ideas.”). Howev-
er, though Kerr recognized and applied the academic speech exception, Kerr pre-dated Savage, and the 
Sixth Circuit did not acknowledge Kerr in Savage. 
 122. 541 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 123. Id. at 771. 
 124. Id. at 772. 
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[T]he Dean’s office has harassed, discriminated against, and frustrated our 
educational and research activities. . . . I find the Dean’s actions unprofes-
sional and vindictive in nature. The [UWM] System has no place for an 
individual, especially an administrator, who has little concern for the stu-
dents and frustrates productive faculty members.125 
Renken shared his complaints with others in UWM’s community, including 
the Chair of UWM’s University Committee.126 During this time, UWM reduced 
Renken’s pay rate.127 In addition to reducing his pay rate, because Renken was re-
peatedly instructed that he must agree to the funding conditions or the fund would 
not be granted and continuously refused to do so, UWM rescinded the NSF fund in 
its entirety.128 Thus, Renken filed suit against UWM for First Amendment retalia-
tion.129 
The district court applied Garcetti’s official duties inquiry and granted 
UWM’s motion for summary judgment on grounds that Renken spoke pursuant to 
his official duties, not as a private citizen; alternatively, even if Renken had spoken 
as a private citizen, the district court held that Renken’s speech on the NSF fund 
did not address a matter of public concern.130 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit, without analyzing whether an academic 
speech exception may exist, affirmed and concluded that Garcetti’s official duties 
inquiry applied.131 Significantly, the court treated Renken’s speech as concerning 
teaching, stating that “in fulfillment of his acknowledged teaching and service re-
sponsibilities . . . Renken appl[ied] for the NSF grant.”132 Nonetheless, administer-
ing the grant fell within Renken’s teaching and services duties that he was em-
ployed to perform.133 Because Renken spoke as a professor, not a private citizen, 
the court held that Renken’s speech was not constitutionally protected.134 
V. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S SUPERFICIAL DIVERGENCE 
In Adams v. Trustees of the University of North Carolina-Wilmington,135 the 
Fourth Circuit recognized and advocated for the existence of an academic speech 
exception to Garcetti.136 But despite those pronouncements, the court ultimately 
resolved the case under Garcetti’s official duties inquiry.137 
                                                          
 125. Id. at 772. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 773. 
 128. Renken, 541 F.3d at 773. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. It should be noted that while Renken’s counsel acknowledged Justice Souter’s hope that 
Garcetti’s majority did not “mean to imperil First Amendment protection of academic freedom in public 
colleges and universities,” Renken’s counsel’s acknowledgement came only at the very end of Renken’s 
appellate brief. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Kevin J. Renken at 23, Renken v. Gregory, 541 F.3d 769 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (No. 07-3126). This may suggest that the argument was not properly raised. 
 132. Renken, 541 F.3d at 773. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 774–75. 
 135. 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 136. Id. at 560–61. 
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528 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 51 
 
Plaintiff Michael Adams, a tenured associate professor of criminology in the 
University of North Carolina-Wilmington’s (UNCW) Department of Sociology and 
Criminal Justice (Department), brought First Amendment claims when UNCW 
denied him a promotion.138 The events giving rise to his claim began in 2000, 
when, two years after receiving tenure, Adams became a Christian; with his reli-
gious conversion, Adams began vocalizing his beliefs in the local community, 
UNCW’s campus community included.139 Adams expressed his Christian beliefs in 
classes, on campus, on religious radio and television shows, by publishing articles, 
and by writing a book that he planned to publish.140 Adams’s expression did not go 
unnoticed but instead gave rise to numerous complaints in UNCW’s community, 
including among UNCW’s Board of Trustees, faculty, staff, and the public.141 
In 2004, four years after his Christian conversion, Adams applied for promo-
tion to full professor.142 UNCW evaluated full professor applicants on four bases: 
(1) teaching; (2) research or artistic achievement; (3) service; and (4) scholarship 
and professional development.143 These bases required the Department to evaluate 
Adams’s works’ scholarly attributes, if any; therefore, when addressing Adams’s 
application, the Department evaluated Adams’s articles, book, and other columns, 
all of which expressed Adams’s Christian beliefs.144 Because Adams’s works were 
beyond the scope of his academic discipline as criminology professor and were not 
peer-reviewed, the Department found that Adams was lacking as a candidate and 
voted 7-2 to deny his promotion.145 
When Adams brought suit for First Amendment discrimination and retalia-
tion, the district court granted summary judgment in UNCW’s favor, applying Gar-
cetti’s official duties inquiry and finding that Adams had “implicitly acknowl-
edged” that his religious columns, publications, and appearances set forth in his 
promotion application had been performed pursuant to his official duties.146 
The Fourth Circuit reversed on appeal.147 In doing so, the court recognized the 
existence of an academic speech exception to Garcetti.148 The court emphasized 
that the district court’s decision rested on several fundamental errors because “the 
district court applied Garcetti without acknowledging, let alone addressing, the 
clear language in that opinion that casts doubt on whether the Garcetti analysis 
applies in the academic context of a public university.”149 Moreover, citing circuit 
                                                          
 138. Id. at 553. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 554–55. 
 141. Adams, 640 F.3d at 554–55. 
 142. Id. at 553. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 554–56. 
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 146. Id. at 556, 561. 
 147. Adams, 640 F.3d at 566. 
 148. Though the court reversed on Garcetti’s official duties inquiry, the court remanded the case 
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 149. Adams, 640 F.3d at 561. 
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precedent from Lee v. York County School Division,150 which applied the Picker-
ing-Connick balancing test when faced with a public high school teacher’s bulletin 
board posting, the Adams court noted that the basis for applying Pickering-Connick 
as opposed to Garcetti “is equally—if not more—valid in the public university set-
ting, which is the specific arena that concerned both the majority and the dissent in 
Garcetti.”151 The court further emphasized that: 
Applying Garcetti to the academic work of a public university faculty 
member under the facts of this case could place beyond the reach of First 
Amendment protection many forms of public speech or service a professor 
engaged in during his employment. That would not appear to be what 
Garcetti intended, nor is it consistent with our long-standing recognition 
that no individual loses his ability to speak as a private citizen by virtue of 
his employment. In light of the above factors, we will not apply Garcetti to 
the circumstances of this case.152 
Nonetheless, the court, in fact, relied on Garcetti’s official duties inquiry to 
find that the First Amendment protected Adams’s speech.153 Instead of doing as the 
court advocated and applying an academic speech exception to Garcetti, the court 
reasoned that Adams spoke as a private citizen because Adams’s speech was unre-
lated to any of his official duties.154 As the court explained: 
Put simply, Adams’ speech was not tied to any more specific or direct em-
ployee duty than the general concept that professors will engage in writ-
ing, public appearances, and service. . . . [T]hat thin thread is insufficient 
to render Adams’ speech “pursuant to [his] official duties” as intended by 
Garcetti.155 
The conclusion that the First Amendment protected Adams’s speech was 
therefore grounded in a narrow application of Garcetti’s official duties inquiry, not 
an academic speech exception. 156  Indeed, because Adams’s speech was private 
speech, Garcetti’s official duties inquiry did not bar Adams’s speech from First 
Amendment protection.157 As Professor Bauries clarified, despite the court’s appar-
ent recognition of an academic speech exception to Garcetti, the court’s reasoning 
shows that if Adams “had written provocatively . . . on the subject of criminology, 
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and his colleagues had retaliated against him for that, then his speech would have 
been directly applied to his official duties, and the Garcetti exemption would have 
applied.”158 
VI. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE DIVIDE: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S SOLUTION 
TO GARCETTI’S UNCERTAINTY 
In January 2014, the Ninth Circuit recognized and applied an academic 
speech exception to Garcetti, extending further than any other federal court of ap-
peals to provide First Amendment protections for the work of university professors 
and faculty. The case’s relevant background facts, the district court’s analysis, and 
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis are set forth below. 
A. Background Facts 
Plaintiff David Demers worked as a tenured associate professor at Washing-
ton State University (WSU) in the Edward R. Murrow College of Communication 
(Murrow School). 159  Demers was involved in the Murrow School’s Structure 
Committee (Committee), which, in late 2006, was considering restructuring the 
College of Communication.160 At that time, the Murrow School faculty was divided 
between Communications Studies and Mass Communications; through his Com-
mittee role, Demers advocated to re-structure the Murrow School by separating the 
two faculties.161 By separating the two faculties, Demers believed that the Mass 
Communications faculty would be strengthened by being able to appoint a director 
with a strong professional background and provide prominent roles to faculty with 
professional backgrounds.162 When he proposed this idea to the other Committee 
members, Demers roused considerable disagreement.163 
In January 2007, after proposing his idea to the Committee and causing dis-
cord, Demers drafted a two-page pamphlet, called the 7-Step Plan for Improving 
the Quality of the Edward R. Murrow School of Communication (7-Step Plan).164 
The cover of Demers’s 7-Step Plan indicated that Demers’s personal publishing 
company, Marquette Books, LLC, was responsible for preparing and circulating the 
pamphlet, and that Demers’s company had no ties with WSU.165 
In Demers’s 7-Step Plan, he detailed the idea that he had previously proposed 
to the Committee about separating the two faculties.166 These seven steps were: 
1. Separate the mass communication program from the communication 
studies program at WSU—i.e., create two separate units; 
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2. Hire a director of the Edward R. Murrow School of Communication 
who has a strong professional background; 
3. Create an Edward R. Murrow Center for Media Research that conducts 
joint research projects with the professional community; 
4. Give professionals an active (rather than the current passive) role in the 
development of the curriculum in the School; 
5. Give professional faculty a more active role in the development of the 
undergraduate curriculum for mass communication students; 
6. Seek national accreditation for the “new” mass communication pro-
gram; 
7.  Hire more professional faculty with substantial work experience.167 
Demers submitted his 7-Step Plan to WSU’s Provost.168 Demers also circulat-
ed his 7-Step Plan to other WSU faculty and local broadcast media in Washington 
State.169 Demers believed that by implementing his 7-Step Plan, the discipline of 
mass communications would be connected to the “real world of professional com-
municators” and thus restored.170 
At that time, in addition to his 7-Step Plan, Demers was also writing a book, 
called The Ivory Tower of Babel (Ivory Tower), which he indicated criticized 
WSU’s “bureaucratic niche” and the social sciences as a whole.171 Demers de-
scribed Ivory Tower by expressing that it “examine[d] the role and function of so-
cial science research in society. . . . Social scientific research generally has little 
impact on public policy decisions and almost never has a direct impact on solving 
social problems. Instead, social movements play a much more important role . . . 
.”172 When preparing his faculty report in 2006, 2007, and 2008, Demers submitted 
select excerpts from Ivory Tower to WSU’s management.173 Though Demers pri-
marily drafted Ivory Tower while on sabbatical, he did so to fulfill WSU’s scholar-
ly publication requirement for professors and faculty.174 
After distributing his 7-Step Plan and Ivory Tower excerpts, Demers claimed 
that WSU retaliated against him by having: (1) knowingly used incorrect infor-
mation to lower his performance review scores; (2) falsely stated that Demers had 
cancelled classes; (3) falsely asserted that Demers had conducted an improper pro-
cess when forming Marquette Books, LLC; (4) prevented Demers from serving on 
certain committees; (5) prevented Demers from teaching basic Communications 
courses; (6) instigated two internal audits against Demers; (7) sent Demers a disci-
plinary warning; and (8) excluded Demers from heading the Murrow School’s 
journalism sequence.175 Demers argued that these actions had caused him a loss in 
                                                          
 167. Id. at 414–15. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 415. 
 171. Id. at 406–07. 
 172. Demers, 746 F.3d at 408. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Demers, No. CV-09-334-RHW, 2011 WL 2182100, at *11, *14. 
 175. Demers, 746 F.3d at 408. 
532 IDAHO LAW REVIEW [VOL. 51 
 
compensation and compromised his academic reputation.176 Thus, Demers brought 
suit against WSU for First Amendment retaliation. 
B. The District Court 
The district court granted WSU’s motion for summary judgment.177 Applying 
Garcetti’s official duties inquiry, the court began its analysis by focusing on 
whether Demers spoke pursuant to his official duties as a professor or as a private 
citizen.178 Because Demers distributed his 7-Step Plan while serving on the Com-
mittee, the district court reasoned that Demers had distributed the 7-Step Plan pur-
suant to his official job duties, not as a private citizen.179 Likewise, because Demers 
wrote Ivory Tower to fulfill WSU’s scholarly publication requirements, it too rep-
resented speech made pursuant to Demers’s employment as professor.180  Thus, 
Garcetti’s threshold official duties inquiry barred Demers’s First Amendment claim 
with no need to consider whether Demers’s speech addressed matters of public 
concern or whether Demers’s interest in free speech outweighed WSU’s interests in 
a smoothly functioning institution. 
But the court went further, speculating that even if Demers had spoken as a 
private citizen, neither his 7-Step Plan nor Ivory Tower addressed matters of public 
concern.181 The court found that because both works dealt with issues that were 
relevant only to the Murrow School and WSU’s journalism education, neither work 
had any relevance to the public’s evaluation of the governmental agencies.182 The 
court described both works as “personnel-related grievances and a workplace 
struggle for power,” which, by their nature, are not matters of public concern.183 
C. Demers’s Appeal 
When Demers appealed, the Ninth Circuit reversed on grounds that Demers’s 
speech should have been analyzed under an academic speech exception to Garcet-
ti.184 The court began its analysis by emphasizing that the “vigilant protection of 
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American 
schools.”185 The court then recognized an academic speech exception to Garcetti’s 
official duties inquiry.186 Because Garcetti’s threshold official duties inquiry bars 
First Amendment claims from all but public employees who are not speaking pur-
suant to their official duties to therefore qualify as private citizens, the Demers 
court recognized that “Garcetti does not—indeed, consistent with the First 
                                                          
 176. Id. 
 177. Demers, No. CV-09-334-RHW, 2011 WL 2182100, at *4. 
 178. Id. at *3. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Demers, No. CV-09-334-RHW, 2011 WL 2182100, at *3. 
 184. Demers, 746 F.3d at 413–14. 
 185. Id. at 411 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 
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 186. Demers, 746 F.3d at 412. 
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Amendment, cannot—apply to teaching and academic writing that are performed 
‘pursuant to the official duties’ of a teacher and professor.”187 
With this analysis, Demers became the first federal court of appeals case to 
apply the academic speech exception. And, because the Supreme Court has not 
provided a relevant analytical framework to which academic speech should be ap-
plied, the Demers court was left to create its own framework. Thus, the court’s 
threshold inquiry was whether Demers’s speech was sufficiently related to academ-
ic research, scholarship, or teaching to qualify as academic speech or expression.188 
The remaining two steps were subject to Pickering-Connick’s balancing test, which 
requires that the employee show his speech addressed matters of public concern 
and that the employee’s interest in a right to free speech outweighs the employer’s 
interest in efficiency.189 
Reaching Demers’s materials, the court first “put to one side” Ivory Tower.190 
Demers did not put a draft or any of its chapters into the record; instead, Demers 
indicated that Ivory Tower contained “information that [was] critical of the acade-
my, including some events at Washington State University.”191 The court’s con-
cern, however, was that Demers had described no specific events at WSU to which 
Ivory Tower ostensibly referred.192 Given that the court was unable to evaluate the 
specific content of Ivory Tower, the court had no way to determine whether Ivory 
Tower was sufficiently related to research, scholarship, or teaching to qualify as 
academic expression, much less expression addressing a matter of public con-
cern.193 
The court next turned to Demers’s 7-Step Plan, considering first whether his 
7-Step Plan constituted academic speech or expression.194 Conceding that it may be 
difficult to determine when speech is sufficiently “related to scholarship or teach-
ing” in the words of Garcetti, the court reasoned that Demers’s 7-Step Plan was 
academic speech. 195  Though not traditional research, scholarship, or teaching, 
Demers’s 7-Step Plan was not merely “a proposal to allocate one additional teach-
ing credit for teaching a large class instead of a seminar, to adopt a dress code that 
would require male teachers to wear neckties, or to provide a wider range of choic-
es in the student cafeteria.”196 By contrast, if Demers’s 7-Step Plan had been im-
plemented, it would “have substantially altered the nature of what was taught at the 
school, as well as the composition of the faculty that would teach it.”197 Thus, 
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Demers’s 7-Step Plan had a nexus to teaching—because of that nexus to teaching, 
the court concluded that Demers’s 7-Step Plan qualified as academic speech.198 
With the threshold question of academic speech met, the court turned to Pick-
ering-Connick, asking whether: (1) Demers’s 7-Step Plan addressed a matter of 
public concern and (2) Demers’s interests outweighed WSU’s interests.199 As to the 
public concern element, the court first sought to clarify two obvious ends of the 
public concern spectrum with respect to academic speech—first, not all professorial 
speech addresses matters of public concern, and second, protected academic writing 
is not confined to scholarship.200 
The second consideration was key to finding that Demers’s 7-Step Plan con-
stituted academic expression on a matter of public concern. Indeed, the court 
acknowledged that “academics, in the course of their academic duties, also write 
memoranda, reports, and other documents addressed to such things as a budget, 
departmental structure, and faculty hiring. . . . [S]uch writing may well address 
matters of public concern.”201 To illustrate this point, the court found a poignant 
example from Pickering, where a letter to the local newspaper criticizing the school 
district’s funding methods was determined to have addressed a matter of public 
concern.202 
Turning to Demers’s 7-Step Plan, the court found that its contents addressed 
matters of public concern because the 7-Step Plan could “fairly be considered to 
relate to ‘any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community,’”203 
noting that: 
The first page of the Plan gave an abbreviated history of “mass communi-
cations programs . . . and the academy in general,” and placed the com-
munications program at WSU in the broader context of similar programs 
at other universities. The second page recommended seven steps for im-
proving the communications program at WSU. Demers's Plan did not fo-
cus on a personnel issue or internal dispute of no interest to anyone out-
side a narrow “bureaucratic niche.” 
 
* * * 
Nor did the Plan address the role of particular individuals in the Murrow 
School, or voice personal complaints. Rather, the Plan made broad pro-
posals to change the direction and focus of the School. . . . The importance 
of the proposed steps in Demers's Plan is suggested by the fact that the 
Murrow School had appointed a “Structure Committee,” of which Demers 
was a member, to address some of the very issues addressed in Demers's 
Plan.204 
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Moreover, the manner in which Demers distributed his 7-Step Plan further 
showed that it addressed matters of public concern. This was because Demers dis-
tributed his 7-Step Plan to the President and Provost of WSU, to members of the 
Murrow School’s Professional Advisory Board, to other WSU faculty, and to local 
broadcast media, in addition to posting his 7-Step Plan on his personal website.205 
Demers’s efforts to make his 7-Step Plan publicly available distinguished his 7-
Step Plan from an employee grievance expressed to a limited audience, which, as 
the court indicated, would suggest a matter not of public concern.206 
As noted above, Demers’s 7-Step Plan largely criticized the Murrow School’s 
current governance and structure issues, and proposed new procedures.207 Recog-
nizing that Demers’s speech closely resembled governance speech, the court 
acknowledged that “there may be some instances in which speech about academic 
organization and governance does not address matters of public concern.”208 But in 
Demers’s case, the court found otherwise, concluding that Demers’s 7-Step Plan 
concerned serious suggestions about the future of an important WSU department, at 
a time when the Murrow School was debating some of those suggestions.209 Thus, 
Demers’s 7-Step Plan addressed matters of public concern to pass muster under 
Pickering-Connick’s first step.210 
Respecting Pickering-Connick’s second step, that is, whether Demers’s inter-
ests outweighed those of WSU, the court remanded the case to district court for 
consideration of whether: (1) WSU had a sufficient interest in controlling or sanc-
tioning Demers’s circulation of the 7-Step Plan to limit Demers’s First Amendment 
protection; (2) the 7-Step Plan’s circulation was a substantial or motivating factor 
in the adverse employment actions that Demers suffered; and (3) WSU had a suffi-
cient alternative basis upon which to take adverse action against Demers, regardless 
of his protected speech. 211  The court further instructed that “[t]he nature and 
strength of the interest of an employing academic institution will also be difficult to 
assess,” causing the court to “hesitate before concluding that we know better than 
the institution itself the nature and strength of its legitimate interests.”212 
The Demers framework, substituting an academic speech inquiry for Garcet-
ti’s official duties inquiry, protects academic speech and consists of a three-step 
analysis. First, the educator has the burden to show that his speech has a nexus to 
research, scholarship, or teaching to qualify as academic speech or expression.213 
Second, the educator must show that his speech addressed a matter of public con-
cern.214 Third, the educator’s speech must not cause significant disruption to the 
employer so that the employer will be unable to meet its burden to show that its 
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interest in a smoothly functioning institution of higher education outweighs the 
educator’s interest in free speech.215 
VII. DEFINING ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
The legitimacy of the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Demers, which defines aca-
demic speech as that which has a nexus to research, scholarship, or teaching and 
properly provides First Amendment protection to university professors and faculty 
for speech and expression made pursuant to their official duties, turns on clarifying 
what is meant by “academic freedom.” Academic freedom, although not enumerat-
ed in the Constitution, has long been viewed a “special concern” of the First 
Amendment.216 However, a precise legal definition of academic freedom has yet to 
be provided. As Professor Byrne explained, “Lacking definition, the doctrine floats 
in law, picking up decisions as a hull does barnacles.”217 
As set forth below, searching for a definition of academic freedom shows that 
academic freedom should function to strike a proper balance between the autonomy 
of the individual and institution. Demers’s three-step analytical framework 
achieves this balance. 
A. Academic Freedom Seeks to Properly Balance the Autonomy of the Individual 
and Institution 
Courts and commentators alike indicate that “academic freedom” is suscepti-
ble to at least two possible definitions, each with a corresponding application. The 
first possibility is that academic freedom applies to protect the individual’s re-
search, scholarship, and teaching from the institution’s restraint or direction.218 The 
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second possibility is that academic freedom applies to protect the institution’s abil-
ity to organize and offer a curriculum without interference from the government, 
big business, and the individuals whom it employs.219 
At face value, these two possible definitions of academic freedom seem para-
doxical. Indeed, if a university could simply fire professors or faculty members for 
anything that they say, teach, or write, the professor or faculty member would ar-
gue that his right to academic freedom was undermined by the institution. Like-
wise, if the institution had no means by which to set standards, limit, or otherwise 
direct professors and faculty in their research, scholarship, and teaching, the institu-
tion would necessarily argue that its right to academic freedom was undermined by 
the individual. 
Reconciling this paradox requires concluding that academic freedom cannot 
be mutually exclusive. Thus, both the individual’s and institution’s interests de-
serve proper weight. Despite many courts applying mutually exclusive definitions 
of academic freedom,220 academic freedom should function to establish a balance 
between the autonomy of the individual and institution. Specifically, academic 
freedom should provide a right “to engage in professional speech within a disci-
pline without extraneous restraint.”221 Therefore, academic freedom is best under-
stood as “encompass[ing] both the ongoing health of universities as institutions that 
promote the growth of disciplinary knowledge and the capacity of individual schol-
ars to promote and disseminate the results of disciplinary inquiry.”222 
Perhaps the most influential explication of academic freedom is found in the 
1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom (1940 Statement) set forth by 
the American Association of University Professors (AAUP).223 Though the 1940 
Statement is not legal authority, it “has been endorsed by over 180 educational or-
ganizations and . . . has become ‘the general norm of academic practice in the Unit-
ed States.’”224 In the 1940 Statement, the AAUP articulated three illuminating prin-
ciples, all of which seek to properly balance the autonomy of the individual and 
institution: 
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1. Teachers are entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication 
of the results, subject to the adequate performance of their other academic 
duties; but research for pecuniary return should be based upon an under-
standing with the authorities of the institution. 
2. Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing their 
subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their teaching con-
troversial matter which has no relation to their subject. Limitations of aca-
demic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution should 
be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment. 
3. College and university teachers are citizens, members of a learned pro-
fession, and officers of an educational institution. When they speak or 
write as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship or dis-
cipline, but their special position in the community imposes special obli-
gations. As scholars and educational officers, they should remember that 
the public may judge their profession and their institution by their utter-
ances. Hence they should at all times be accurate, should exercise appro-
priate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should 
make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the institu-
tion.225 
These three key principles enshrine values that were previously set forth in 
the AAUP’s 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure 
(1915 Declaration).226 The 1915 Declaration provided that the “liberty of the schol-
ar within the university to set forth his conclusions, be they what they may, is con-
ditioned by their being conclusions gained by a scholar’s method and held in a 
scholar’s spirit . . . .”227 Emphasizing the individual, the 1915 Declaration was 
drafted when employment at-will stood at its zenith, allowing employers, including 
universities, to fire employees “for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause 
morally wrong, without thereby being guilty of a legal wrong.”228 Indeed, two chief 
drafters of the 1915 Declaration, Edwin R.A. Seligman and Arthur O. Lovejoy, 
were “intimately acquainted with and appalled by application to the professoriat of 
the American doctrine of employment-at-will.”229 But seeking to balance the indi-
vidual’s and the institution’s interests, the 1915 declaration stressed that the indi-
vidual’s work must be “the fruits of competent and patient and sincere inquiry.”230 
The 1940 Statement’s three principles illustrate that academic freedom carries 
with it rights and duties for both the individual and institution. Regarding the indi-
vidual, the 1940 Statement acknowledges that professors and faculty, having re-
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ceived specialized training,231 are subject to self-regulation and should be permitted 
to exercise professional competence in their work. Regarding the institution, the 
1940 Statement expressly anticipates that institutions will establish standards and 
limitations, requiring that “[l]imitations of academic freedom . . . should be clearly 
stated in writing at the time of the appointment.”232 This allows the institution to 
set, for example, standards to ensure quality scholarship. So long as the institution 
establishes standards that comport with legitimate norms of the respective academ-
ic discipline, academic freedom must function to allow the institution to set appro-
priate standards for and limitations on its professors and faculty. 233  Like First 
Amendment protection in other contexts, a First Amendment right to academic 
freedom should not be understood as an absolute right.234 
B. Demers Serves as the Proper Analytical Framework 
Consistent with the 1940 Statement’s three principles, the Demers framework 
serves to protect academic freedom for both the individual and institution by seek-
ing to arrive at a proper balance between the autonomy of the individual and insti-
tution by means of each of its three analytical steps. 
First, to protect the individual’s autonomy, the Demers framework substitutes 
Garcetti’s threshold official duties inquiry with an academic speech inquiry tai-
lored to encompass speech or expression having a nexus to research, scholarship, or 
teaching.235 As Demers itself suggests, governance and service speech may well 
qualify as protected academic speech, so long as the speech shares a nexus to re-
search, scholarship, or teaching. 236  Second, by adhering to Pickering-Connick’s 
public concern requirement, Demers clarifies that not all speech qualifying as aca-
demic speech will receive First Amendment protection; instead, the speech must 
address a matter of public concern.237 Third, again adhering to Pickering-Connick, 
to fully consider the institution’s autonomy, allowing the institution to set standards 
ensuring quality scholarship and professional conduct as the 1940 Statement in-
tended, Demers requires that the individual’s interest outweigh the institution’s.238 
In fact, Demers specifically instructs that the “nature and strength of the interest of 
an employing academic institution will be difficult to assess,” and that courts 
should “hesitate before concluding that [courts] kn[o]w better than the institution 
itself the nature and strength of its legitimate interests.”239 The Demers framework, 
then, is the proper means by which to protect academic freedom, giving full con-
sideration to both the individual and institution. 
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VIII. DEMERS APPLIED 
Having shown that Demers presents the proper framework under which aca-
demic speech and expression should be analyzed, the discussion set forth below 
revisits the cases discussed in Parts IV and V and applies the Demers framework, 
seeking to determine whether Demers would have led to a different outcome. Be-
cause Gorum, Savage, and Gee are similar in that these courts did not resolve 
whether an academic speech exception may exist, these cases are discussed collec-
tively. Because Adams diverged in recognizing the existence of an academic speech 
exception, Adams is discussed separately. 
A. A Second Look at Gorum, Savage, and Renken 
Gorum represents one end of the spectrum, where applying Demers would 
produce the same result. Savage represents a middle ground, where Demers likely 
would produce the opposite result. Renken represents another end of the spectrum, 
where Demers would produce a different outcome. 
Gorum, where the court held that Gorum’s speech at the student disciplinary 
hearing and in rescinding Sessoms’s invitation to speak at a breakfast was not pro-
tected academic speech, establishes one end of the spectrum.240 Gorum shows that 
if the Third Circuit were to recognize and apply an academic speech exception, the 
Third Circuit’s definition of academic speech would be narrow, providing universi-
ty professors and faculty with little First Amendment protection unless their ex-
pression was traditional research, scholarship, or teaching. 241  Any other speech 
could arguably be characterized as governance speech, even if it had a nexus to 
academic matters, found that it was not sufficiently related to academic speech or 
expression, linked to official duties, and therefore deemed unprotected.242 
However, applying Demers’s framework to the facts of Gorum would likely 
not change Gorum’s outcome. Though Demers’s definition of academic speech 
encompasses speech with a nexus to research, scholarship, or teaching, governance 
and service speech included, neither Gorum’s speech at the disciplinary hearing nor 
rescinding Sessoms’s invitation had any effect on research, teaching, or scholar-
ship.243 Perhaps the Gorum court was correct when it stated that Gorum’s speech 
was “so clearly” not speech related to scholarship or teaching.244 But if Demers had 
protected Gorum’s speech as academic speech, Gorum’s speech may have ad-
dressed a matter of public concern because it dealt with matters beyond Gorum’s 
private interests, implicating a student’s consequences for disciplinary violations.245 
Moreover, because Gorum would have had a significant interest in a right to free 
speech so as to adequately represent the student at the disciplinary hearing, 
Gorum’s interests may have outweighed DSU’s interests in suppressing Gorum’s 
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speech.246 But even so, because Gorum admitted to having forged grades for 48 
students, Gorum’s misconduct presented DSU with a sufficient alternative basis 
upon which to discharge Gorum, regardless of whether Gorum engaged in any pro-
tected academic expression.247 
Savage, where the court held that Savage’s book recommendation was not 
protected academic speech, represents the middle ground.248 The Savage court’s 
analysis shows that if the Sixth Circuit were to recognize and apply an academic 
speech exception, its application would be limited by a very narrow definition of 
academic speech.249 Indeed, Savage’s book recommendation containing the anti-
homosexual chapter was certainly related to teaching on grounds that the book was 
proposed for assignment to all incoming freshman.250 But despite that close nexus 
to teaching, the Savage court held that Savage’s book recommendation was only 
“loosely related,” if at all, to academic speech or expression.251 Thus, the Savage 
court’s conclusion that Savage’s speech was not protected academic speech indi-
cates that the Sixth Circuit’s definition of academic speech would be more restric-
tive than the Third Circuit’s definition, encompassing only research, scholarship, 
and teaching if it is part of an official course curriculum.252 
Applying the Demers framework to the facts of Savage suggests that Savage’s 
speech would likely be protected academic speech. Savage’s speech was very simi-
lar to Demers’s speech because, like Demers’s 7-Step Plan, Savage’s book recom-
mendation had a nexus to material that would be taught on the basis that all incom-
ing freshman would have been assigned to read Savage’s recommended book.253 
Though it could be argued that Savage’s book recommendation was not academic 
speech because it was not associated with an official course, Demers does not im-
pose this requirement.254 Moreover, Savage’s book recommendation may have ad-
dressed matters of public concern because the book would have been widely dis-
tributed to all incoming freshman.255 But even if Savage’s book recommendation 
had addressed matters of public concern, OSU would have had a legitimate interest 
in regulating the books with which incoming freshman would be welcomed to 
OSU, and this legitimate interest would have likely outweighed Savage’s interest in 
a right to freely propose his recommended book.256 
At the opposite end of the spectrum is Renken, where the court held that 
Renken’s speech on the NSF grant was not protected academic speech.257 The fact 
that the Renken court did not inquire into the possible existence of an academic 
speech exception may have been central to its holding. The Renken court did, how-
ever, treat Renken’s speech on the NSF grant as concerning teaching, specifically 
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noting that in “fulfillment of his acknowledged teaching and service responsibili-
ties,” Renken applied for the NSF grant.258 But because the Renken court did not 
address whether an academic speech exception may exist, there is no indication as 
to what the Seventh Circuit’s relevant definition of academic speech would be if 
the Seventh Circuit were to recognize and apply an academic speech exception. 
Nonetheless, based on the conclusion that Renken’s speech was related to teaching 
under Garcetti’s official duties inquiry, Renken may be very similar to Demers on 
grounds that the Seventh Circuit’s definition of academic speech would likely en-
compass speech with a nexus to be research, scholarship, or teaching, perhaps even 
governance speech.259 
Under the Demers framework, Renken’s speech likely would have been pro-
tected academic speech. Because Renken’s speech regarding the NSF grant shared 
a necessary nexus to material that Renken would teach, Demers’s definition of aca-
demic speech would have encompassed Renken’s speech.260 Likewise, because the 
NSF grant touched on Renken’s course curriculum, in addition to expressing con-
cerns that UWM’s conditions violated NSF regulations, Renken’s speech very like-
ly addressed matters of public concern.261 And, Renken’s legitimate interest in tai-
loring his course curriculum and ensuring that UWM complied with NSF regula-
tions would have outweighed UWM’s interest in suppressing Renken’s speech.262 
In sum, applying the Demers framework to the cases set forth above shows 
that Demers balances the interests of both the individual and institution, ensuring 
that each is given proper consideration. 
B. Revisiting Adams 
In Demers, the Ninth Circuit cited to Adams, stating that Adams supported 
recognizing and applying an academic speech exception to Garcetti.263 Though 
Adams indeed recognized the existence of an academic speech exception, Adams 
and Demers are different in two key ways, thereby causing Adams’s rationale to 
largely undermine Demers. 
First, the facts in Adams stand inapposite to the facts in Demers. In Adams, 
Adams spoke and wrote on religious issues, and because Adams was a criminology 
professor, Adams’s religious speech was therefore private speech on the basis that 
it was related to none of his official duties.264 But in Demers, Demers wrote his 7-
Step Plan as part of his Committee role.265 Thus, in Adams, the speech had no con-
nection with Adams’s employment, whereas in Demers, the speech and Demers’s 
official duties were one and the same. In the first instance, Adams’s speech did not 
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become unprotected under Garcetti’s official duties inquiry; in the latter, Demers’s 
speech would have been categorically unprotected.266 
Second, the Fourth Circuit’s recognition of an academic speech exception and 
the Ninth Circuit’s application of the academic speech exception suggest differing 
reaches of the exception altogether. In Adams, the court acknowledged that the aca-
demic speech exception would not apply in certain instances.267 Specifically, if a 
“public university faculty member’s assigned duties include a specific role in de-
claring or administering university policy, as opposed to scholarship or teaching . . . 
Garcetti may apply.”268 In Demers, however, Demers held a committee role in de-
claring and administering new university policy.269 And, indeed, Demers’s 7-Step 
Plan itself advocated for declaring new university policy.270 Though the Demers 
court found that Demers’s 7-Step Plan was sufficiently related to research, scholar-
ship, or teaching to qualify as academic speech because of its nexus to what would 
be taught at the Murrow School, that conclusion sits inapposite to Adams, where 
the court’s “declaring or administering university policy” limitation would likely 
have excluded Demers’s 7-Step Plan from the definition of academic speech.271 
This limitation would therefore have caused Garcetti’s official duties inquiry to 
apply, indicating that the Ninth Circuit’s definition of academic speech is broader 
than the Fourth Circuit’s.272 
Nonetheless, applying Demers to the facts of Adams would not have produced 
a different result, due to the fact that the Adams court concluded that Adams’s 
speech was protected under Garcetti’s official duties inquiry. 273  Demers would 
have applied to hold that Adams’s speech was protected academic speech because 
of its nexus to Adams’s research, scholarship, and teaching, but the outcome would 
be no different. And, though Adams’s speech is protected under both Garcetti and 
Demers, Adams’s speech very likely did not address a matter of public concern 
because Adams spoke about personal religious beliefs.274 Likewise, even if Ad-
ams’s speech had been on a matter of public concern, UNCW’s interest in setting 
legitimate scholarship standards for professors and faculty would have outweighed 
Adams’s interest to speak freely on religious beliefs unrelated to his work as crimi-
nology professor.275 
IX. AN ACADEMIC SPEECH EXCEPTION IS NECESSARY 
Universities perform many essential functions, undoubtedly occupying a spe-
cial role in American society. In addition to educating students and preparing them 
for modern professions, the university serves the common good and “epitomizes a 
liberal faith that a free people can, like the college itself, cast off authoritarianism 
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without lapsing into total relativism or incoherence.”276 The future of disinterested 
scholarship and teaching—the tenets of the modern university—requires that uni-
versity professors and faculty enjoy a First Amendment right to free speech and 
expression in performing their official duties. 
As set forth in Part I, academic freedom faces three primary sources of ten-
sion: the individual, the institution, and the judiciary.277 Indeed, “the institutional 
setting, the educational objective, and the meaning and status of academic freedom 
are, as we have seen, intimately connected.”278 Demers properly safeguards aca-
demic freedom by seeking to arrive at a proper balance between the autonomy of 
the individual and institution. 279 In contrast, Garcetti’s threshold official duties 
inquiry suppresses academic freedom by categorically barring research, scholar-
ship, and teaching from First Amendment protection because these duties stand at 
the core of university professors and faculty.280 This categorical exclusion under-
mines the essence of academic freedom by granting unfettered power to the institu-
tion.281 
Nonetheless, arguments against an individual First Amendment right to aca-
demic freedom indeed exist. In the context of recognizing an academic speech ex-
ception to Garcetti’s official duties inquiry, the argument against individual aca-
demic freedom centers on the fact that the Court left the question open.282 But be-
yond Garcetti’s context, arguments against individual academic freedom primarily 
hinge on a lack of clear constitutional support from the Framers and the majority of 
courts’ persistent unwillingness to give a protective analytical structure to the doc-
trine.283 Professor Pendleton, who advocated on behalf of a right to individual aca-
demic freedom, identified examples of common additional concerns that run con-
trary to recognizing an individual First Amendment right to academic freedom: 
[T]he temptation remains to make things “better” by imposing controls on 
the classroom. Should not students be free from error in instruction? 
Should not students be free from fear, confusion, intimidation, and belit-
tlement? Should not universities protect students from improper views, 
outdated theories, and distorted data? If faculty remain to teach as they 
wish, will they not release evils of the worst sort on the impressionable 
young?284 
These concerns are valid and should not be overlooked. But the routine an-
swers to these concerns, which are to add additional administrative powers and 
increased classroom intrusion, oversight, and regulation,285 disregard that university 
professors and faculty possess professional competence and integrity. These an-
swers “are supplied because they are easy and they appeal to those who little under-
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stand education,”286 and thus, these answers “suffer from a lack of academic pur-
pose, scholarly direction, and educational integrity.”287 Therefore, these answers 
have the effect of undermining academic freedom by taking autonomy away from 
professors and faculty, who are most qualified to make decisions on many academ-
ic matters, and entrusting the institution with unfettered power to make decisions 
that may well be illegitimate without considering academic freedom’s proper bal-
ance. 
In contrast, Demers allows courts to consider these valid concerns, ensuring 
that neither the individual nor institution will have unfettered control. Demers 
properly acknowledges that freedom in research, scholarship, and teaching, subject 
to legitimate limitations imposed by the institution, is fundamental to academic 
freedom and the advancement and creation of both truth and knowledge.288 Apply-
ing Demers provides professors and faculty with greater job security and allows 
them to exercise professional competence in pursuing the “pedagogy and content of 
their classes as they judge best,” 289 without fear of retaliation or adverse employ-
ment action. This necessarily fosters meaningful and disinterested research, schol-
arship, and teaching. Academic freedom was never designed to place unfettered 
power in the hands of any source, and doing so spells certain disaster.290 As the 
Supreme Court emphasized in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, “[t]eachers and students 
must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity 
and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.”291 
A. The Academic Speech Exception’s Scope 
The academic speech exception should apply in universities, where the need 
for academic freedom is not only greatest, but essential.292 As the Supreme Court 
acknowledged in Garcetti, a constitutional right to academic freedom should pro-
tect speech related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction.293 But con-
straining the academic speech exception to protect only traditional academic re-
search, scholarship, and teaching in universities ignores many important, additional 
roles that professors and faculty routinely perform. 
To engage in essential and critical collaboration, discourse, and inquiry, pro-
fessors and faculty must enjoy freedom of speech and expression in more than just 
traditional research, scholarship, and teaching. Fostering universities that serve the 
common good requires that professors and faculty be able to freely conduct re-
search, collaborate and engage with diverse colleagues and students, and contribute 
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to discussions about the university’s curriculum.294 Demers allows professors and 
faculty to do that. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Courts have long recognized the importance of academic freedom. But until 
Demers, academic freedom has received few protections, if any. Academic freedom 
should function to provide individual university professors and faculty members 
with First Amendment protection when conducting the research, scholarship, and 
teaching that they were hired to perform. At the same time, academic freedom re-
quires that the institution be able to impose legitimate limitations and direct the 
professors and faculty whom it hires. The future of public universities and their 
valuable role requires balancing the autonomy of the individual and institution be-
cause “[p]aradoxical as it may seem, a public university would violate, not fulfill, 
its public duty if it interfered with the free production of the teaching and scholar-
ship that are not merely the means of achieving its goal but the goal itself.”295 
Though Garcetti left uncertain whether its threshold official duties inquiry was 
intended to apply to academic speech in universities, the Ninth Circuit in Demers 
properly resolved that uncertainty and provided a welcome analytical framework 
for academic speech that protects the future of academic freedom and disinterested 
research, scholarship, and teaching. 
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